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CASENOTE

Wisconsin v. Mitchell: The End of Hate

Crimes or Just the End of the
First Amendment?
INTRODUCTION

The prevalence of bias-motivated violence has become shockingly
apparent in recent years. The infamous videotape of enraged African-American rioters viciously beating white truck driver Reginald Denny during the
Los Angeles riots in the Spring of 1992 is a familiar image to most
Americans.' A criminal act, such as this, which targets a particular victim
because of his or her race, religion, sexual orientation, ethnicity or other
bias-related classification has become commonly referred to as a "hate
crime." Numerous incidents of hate crimes can be seen routinely in the
media. For example, in a Washington suburb, a young white man assaulted
a black woman, beat her, ripped her clothes off, and sprayed her with lighter
fluid while yelling "nigger" and threatening to light her on fire.2 In New
York, a black man was killed after being chased onto a highway by a group
of white men taunting him and wielding baseball bats.3 In Kentucky,
assailants beat a young gay man with a tire iron, locked him into a car trunk
with several snapping turtles and then tried to set the car on fire, leaving
their victim with severe brain damage.4 In Long Island, a black man armed
with a semiautomatic pistol opened fire on a crowded commuter train killing
five people and wounding eighteen others because of his intense hatred for
whites and Asians. 5
Recent statistical data indicates that bias crimes have been rising
1. See Beyond Black and White:

Rethinking Race and Crime in America,

NEWSWEEK, May 18, 1992, at 24 (containing a series of II articles covering the 1992 Los
Angeles, California riots and their aftermath).

2. See Bernd Debusmann, Hate Crime Shocks Washington, Shows Race Problems,

REUTERS, Mar. 4, 1992 (cited in State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 820 (Wis. 1992)).
3. See Dan Collins, A Bitter Bite of the Big Apple, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan.
12, 1987, at 24 (relating the story of the death of Michael Griffith).
4. See Neal R. Peirce, Recurring Nightmare of Hate Crimes, NAT'L J.,
Dec. 15, 1990
at 3045.
5. See John J.Goldman & Helaine Olen, Train Gunman Driven by Hate, Police
Declare, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1993, at 1.
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dramatically, consequently creating a new sense of urgency in finding some
solutions.6 Many state legislatures have responded to this by enacting "hate
crime" statutes, which enhance the penalty for certain criminal behavior
when it is bias-motivated or bias-related. 7 In a rare display of unanimity,
the Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Mitchell 8 ruled that the Constitution did
not forbid the State of Wisconsin from enhancing the sentence of a criminal
defendant when that defendant intentionally selected a victim because of the
race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry
of the person. While this decision may be viewed as a noble attempt by the
Court, and ultimately the legislature, to address the serious problem of
bias-motivated crimes, it may equally be viewed as a devastating blow to the
First Amendment and the fundamental right of free expression and differing
beliefs. Even though there is an unquestionable social need to curb racial,
ethnic and other bias-motivated violence, it is not clearly evident that
attacking speech and thought is an acceptable way to accomplish this goal;
after all, as the saying goes, "The road to hell is paved with good intentions. '9
This note analyzes Wisconsin v. Mitchell, and concludes that the Court
treads dangerously close to criminalizing speech and thought. Although
bigotry and hateful thoughts are deplorable, it is not constitutionally
permissible to punish someone for possessing an unpopular opinion.
However, because the Mitchell Court uncharacteristically turned its back on
the First Amendment, the states are now essentially free to do just that by
penalizing particular beliefs through legislation. In examining this decision,
Part I of this note discusses relevant precedents, focusing on the Court's
prior treatment of governmental restrictions on speech and the constitutional
protections provided by the First Amendment. Part II sets forth the facts,

6. See IMES Hate Crimes Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1988)). Pursuant to the Act, in January 1993, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation reported that 4,558 bias motivated offenses were committed in 1991; Petitioner's Brief at 20, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S.Ct. 2194 (1993) (No. 92-515) (stating that
ten representative jurisdictions have reported an average increase in bias crimes of 24.4% in
1992).
7. See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/12-7.1 (1992); CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.7 (West 1988 &
Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.085 (1991), WIS. STAT. § 939.645 (1990). See also
Petitioner's Brief at 20, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S.Ct. 2194 (1993) (No. 92-515) (citing
to ADL in the Courts: Litigation Docket 1991. ADL LAW REPORT (Anti-Defamation League
of B'nai B'rith, New York, N.Y.)), Fall 1991 (reporting that at least 46 states have enacted
statutes that target bias crimes).
8. 113 S.Ct. 2194, 2197-202 (1993).
9. See State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 814 n.14 (Wis. 1992) (quoting from
GEORGE HERBERT, JACULA PRUDENTUM (1640)).
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presents the procedural history and analyzes the distorted reasoning used in
the Supreme Court's decision. Finally, Part III examines the legal, political
and moral problems associated with the limiting of free expression in a
multicultural society, and speculates as to the effect the Mitchell decision
will have on society and free speech.
I. FREE SPEECH AND THE ROLE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing
speech or expression because of disapproval of the ideas expressed. ° The
Supreme Court has historically been reluctant to rule contrary to this
doctrine, permitting content-based restrictions upon speech in only the few
limited areas of obscenity, defamation and "fighting words."'" However,
these categories have been narrowly defined, and the Court has clearly
established that they do not automatically supersede the First Amendment.12 This has been particularly true of the "fighting words" exception,
which allows a court to classify certain words, such as those "likely to
provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the
peace,""3 as beyond the scope of First Amendment protection. Some
theorists have labeled this as a loophole that may allow state governments
to regulate bias-motivated crimes without violating the First Amendment,
however, the Supreme Court has refused to uphold any convictions under
the doctrine since its inception in 1942.14 Nonetheless, federal and state
legislatures have continued to draft statutes and ordinances in an attempt to
prohibit bigoted or undesirable expression.
In the midst of the Vietnam war, the Court had the task of addressing
such a statute. In United States v. O'Brien,5 the Court reviewed the
10. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 309-11 (1940).
11. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity); Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (defamation); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942) ("fighting words").
12. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2543-44 (1992).
13. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574.
14. See Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974) (words conveying or
intending to convey disgrace are not "fighting words"); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518,
524 (1972) (statute invalid because it was not limited to "words that have a direct tendency
to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is addressed");
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (state was not exercising its police power "to
prevent a speaker from intentionally provoking a given group to hostile reaction"). See
generally Marjorie Heins, Banning Words: A Comment on "Words that Wound," 18 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 585, 587-89 (1983).
15. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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constitutionality of a federal statute prohibiting the destruction or mutilation
of a selective service certificate, specifically when the act of destruction was
done as a form of anti-war protest. 16 Although in effect the statute
prohibited a form of political expression, the Court held that this was merely
an incidental restriction on First Amendment freedoms, justified by the
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the accompanying
non-speech elements.' 7 Applying an unusually lenient standard to a First
Amendment case, the Court emphasized that this decision was based on the
premise that the governmental regulation was unrelated to the suppression
of free expression, and sought only to limit the noncommunicative impact
of the conduct in a way no greater than was essential to the furtherance of
this goal.' 8 More recently, the Court reiterated these prerequisites to
9
upholding a limiting statute in Texas v. Johnson.' In this case, the Court
overturned a demonstrator's conviction under a Texas statute which
20 The Court found that
criminalized the burning of the American flag.
Texas had not asserted an interest unrelated to the suppression of expression,
2
therefore, the "less stringent standard" espoused in O'Brien did not apply. '
Rather, since expression was being restricted because of the content of the
message being conveyed, a more demanding standard was required and the
'22 In
asserted state interest was subject to "the most exacting scrutiny.'
striking down the state's application of the statute, the Court emphasized
that, "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is
that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply
23
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." Nor can
16. Id. at 374-75. Through a 1965 Amendment, Congress added to § 12(b)(3) of the
Universal Military Training and Selective Service Act of 1948 a provision subjecting to
criminal liability not only one who "forges, alters, or in any manner changes" but also one
who "knowingly destroys [or] knowingly mutilates" a selective service certificate. Id. at 375
(quoting 32 C.F.R. § 1617.1 (1965)).
17. Id. at 376.
18. Id. at 377. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
19. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). In this case, Johnson was convicted under a Texas statute
which criminalized the desecration of venerated objects:
(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly desecrates: (1)
a public monument; (2) a place of worship or burial; or (3) a state or national flag.
(b) For purposes of this section, 'desecrate' means deface, damage, or otherwise
physically mistreat in a way that the actor knows will seriously offend one or more
persons likely to observe or discover his action.
TEx. CODE ANN. § 42.09 (West 1989).
20. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
21. Id. at 403; United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
22. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 412 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
23. Id. at 414. See also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55-56 (1988);
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the state punish those who feel differently about certain matters, such as the
sanctity of the American flag.' Furthermore, the state was not justified in
limiting expressive conduct merely because it may have offended the
audience and led to a disturbance of the peace, this presumption did not
place it within the small category of permissibly regulated "fighting
words."' Such a limitation was contrary to precedent, which recognized
that a principal "function of free speech under our system is to invite
dispute."'26 Therefore, the Court concluded that the interests asserted by the
State of Texas could not justify a criminal conviction for engaging in
political expression."
The Court has traditionally applied this same
reasoning to statutes presuming to regulate bigoted speech.
One of the first clashes between the regulation of racist speech and the
First Amendment was Brandenburgv. Ohio,28 which reached the Supreme
Court in 1969. In Brandenburg,the Court reversed the conviction of a Ku
Klux Klan leader and held that expression advocating racial violence was
protected by the First Amendment.29 To limit this holding, the Court
added that regulating such speech because of the idea it conveys is offensive
to the Constitution, "except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action."3 ° Such a qualification is a "fighting words" exception, which as
noted above, has not been invoked by the Court to uphold a conviction since
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.3
In 1977 the problem of ethnic intimidation and prejudice again made
a powerful and terrifying entry into the public eye through Collin v.
Smith.3 2 The National Socialist Party of America (NSPA), a neo-Nazi
group, announced its intention to conduct a march in front of the city hall
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462-63 (1980); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427
U.S. 50, 63-65, 67-68 (1976) (plurality opinion).
24. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 418-19.
25. Id. at 408.
26. Id. (quoting Terminello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1. 4 (1949)).
27. Id. at 420.

28.
29.
30.
31.

395 U.S. 444 (1969).
Id.at 444-45.
Id. at 447-48.
315 U.S. 568 (1942). See generally Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put

You in Jail, But Can Words Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas
of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39 UCLA L. REV. 333 (1991); see also supra text accompanying notes 14-15 for a discussion on "fighting words."
32. 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill.
1978), affTd, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 916 (1978); see A. NEER, DEFENDING MY ENEMY (1979) (a Jewish man's account
of the Skokie incident and its aftermath); see also Greenwalt, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 871 § IV
(1992).
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in Skokie, a Chicago suburb with a large Jewish population, including a
substantial number of holocaust survivors.33 After an unsuccessful attempt
to enjoin the march, the Village of Skokie enacted several ordinances
specifically intended to thwart the Nazi demonstration. 34 These ordinances
conditioned the granting of a parade permit upon a finding that the assembly
would not "portray criminality, depravity or a lack of virtue in, or incite
violence, hatred, abuse or hostility toward a person or group of persons by
reason of reference to religious, racial, ethnic, national or regional affiliation. 3 5 Further, these ordinances prohibited "the dissemination of any
materials which, promotes and incites hatred against persons by reason of
'3 6
The
their race, national origin, or religion, and is intended to do SO."
United States Court of Appeals, for the Seventh Circuit, struck down the
37
Skokie ordinances as unconstitutional under the First Amendment. After
emphasizing their extreme disgust toward the views of the NSPA, calling the
group's beliefs "repugnant to the core values held generally by residents of
this country," the court ruled that the ordinances were content-based
restrictions not permitted under any recognized exceptions, including the
Furthermore, although the court recognized
"fighting words" doctrine.
the Village's argument that such a demonstration could inflict emotional
harm on the Jewish residents, it found criminalizing speech in anticipation
of such a result impermissible. 39 Adding that "[a]ny shock effect must be
attributed io the content of the ideas expressed," the court reiterated
Supreme Court precedent by stating, "[ilt is firmly settled that under our
Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely
40
because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers."
The wide-spread publicity of the Collin case had a powerful impact not
4
only on the public consciousness, but on the state legislatures as well. '
Many public officials and legal theorists embarked on an endeavor to design

33. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1199 (7th Cir. 1978).
34. Id.
35. Id. (quoting Skokie, Ill., Ordinance 77-5-N-994, § 27-56(c) (May 2, 1977)).
36. id. (quoting Skokie, Ill., Ordinance 77-5-N-995, § 28-43.1 (May 2, 1977)).
37. Id. at 1210.
38. Id. at 1200-03.
39. Id. at 1205.
40. Id. at 1206 (quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)). The NSPA
never held the march in Skokie because a few days before the scheduled demonstration it
won the right to march in Chicago's Marquette Park, the group's first choice. The case never
made it beyond the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, sparing the Supreme Court from ruling on
this issue.
41. See generally K. GREENWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND TIHE USES OF LANGUAGE
(1989).
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a statute which would combat "hate crimes" without violating the constitutional guarantees of the First Amendment.42 Two types of statutes that
emerged were laws which increase the penalty for crimes motivated by hate,
and laws which create a separate substantive criminal category for
bias-motivated activity.43 Many states began to enact such laws, but the
44
Supreme Court remained reluctant to rule on their constitutionality.
Finally in 1992, in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,45 the United States
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a modem bias crime law
for the first time. In R.A.V., the Court invalidated a municipal ordinance
prohibiting cross-burning and other actions "which one knows or has
reasonable grounds to know" will cause "anger, alarm or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender."
Holding
that the ordinance was facially invalid, the Court stated "[t]he First
Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those
speakers who express views on disfavored subjects. 47 Moreover, after
reaffirming that content-based regulations are presumptively invalid, the
Court emphasized that in "practical operation, the ordinance goes even
beyond mere content discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination. "48
Therefore, although the Court recognized the city's understandable interest
in confronting and eliminating such bias-motivated behavior, it stressed that
"the manner of that confrontation cannot consist of selective limitations
upon speech." 49 The effort of the state to punish bias crime, in the Court's
view, was unavoidably infected with the impermissible attempt to suppress
racist speech.5"
Although the Supreme Court had finally addressed the validity of a hate
speech law, this decision spawned much confusion. First, only five Justices,
42. See generally Gellman, supra note 31, at 339 n.27 (citing to CIVIL RIGHTS

DIVISION, ADL LEGAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, ADL LAW REPORT: HATE
CRIMES STATUTES: A RESPONSE TO ANTI-SEMITISM, VANDALISM, AND
VIOLENT BIGOTRY 1 (1988 & Supp. 1990) (discussing hate crime statutes and presenting
a model statute).
43. Id. at 1-2. See also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S.Ct. 2538 (1992).
44. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.

45. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
46. Id. at 2540 (quoting St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance,

LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).

ST. PAUL, MINN.

47. Id. at 2547.
48. Id. at 2542, 2547-48. See also Simon v. Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
49. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2548 (1992).
50. Id. at 2549-50.

See generally Frederick M. Lawrence, Resolving the Hate

Crimes/Hate Speech Paradox: Punishing Bias Crimes and Protecting Racist Speech, 68

NoTRE DAME L. REV. 673, 678 (1993).
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a bare majority, were able to agree on how such laws should be analyzed
under the First Amendment. 5' Furthermore, the Minnesota ordinance in
R.A.V. specifically prohibited cross-burning and bias-motivated "disorderly
conduct," thus leaving lower courts unsure of whether hate crime laws that
enhance the penalty for criminal acts motivated by bigotry or prejudice were
also unconstitutional. The uncertainty lead to a split among state supreme
courts.52 Those courts upholding such statutes often cited cases in which
it had been held constitutional for sentencing judges to consider certain
factors to show motive or intent, specifically a defendant's racial animus, or
previous declarations and statements.5 3 These opinions also cited to federal
anti-discrimination laws, which have consistently been held to be constitutional and seem to lend support to the argument that there is no First
Amendment right to discriminate. "4 On the other hand, state courts
opposing such statutes have held that they are an unconstitutional restriction
on the freedom of thought, allowing the states to punish for "what the
legislature has deemed to be offensive thought," or for ideas society finds
disturbing or disagreeable. 5
Recognizing the existence of a conflict of authority among state courts,
and the need to clarify the scope of constitutional protection for bias speech,
6
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Wisconsin v. Mitchell.

O'Connor, J.,
Stevens, J.,
51. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2550-51 (Blackmun, J., White, J.,
concurring) (finding the ordinance fatally overbroad in criminalizing not only unprotected
expression, but also expression protected by the First Amendment, in contrast to the
majority's opinion that the ordinance was underbroad and invalid for discriminately
proscribing only certain speech because of its undesirable content).
52. Compare State v. Plowman, 838 P. 2d 558 (Or. 1992) (upholding an Oregon

intimidation statute, reasoning that the proscription of physical injury. to another based on

defendant's perception of victim's race, color, religion, national origin or sexual orientation
does not violate defendant's right to free expression, the statute proscribes effects, not
expression of opinions) with State v. Wyant, 597 N.E. 2d 450 (Ohio 1992) (striking down
an Ohio intimidation statute, concluding that the effect of the statute, in punishing motive
alone, was to create a "thought crime" in violation of the Constitution).
53. See Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S.Ct. 1093 (1992); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939
(1983); Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631 (1947). See infra text accompanying notes
129-131 & 149-154, for a discussion of these cases.
54. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000, Civil Rights

Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-47.

55. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S.
46 (1988); City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984); State
v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 811 (Wis. 1992).
56. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
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II.

WISCONSIN v. MITCHELL

The facts of Mitchell presented an issue of enormous debate and
controversy, the constitutionality of legislation seeking to address hate
crimes."
Specifically, this case involved the type of hate crime statute
commonly referred to as a penalty enhancer.5 8 The Wisconsin statute
provided for enhancement of the maximum penalty for a criminal act if the
criminal actor intentionally selected the victim because of the victim's race,
religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry.59
Pursuant to this statute, the circuit court substantially enhanced respondent
Todd Mitchell's sentence for aggravated battery."' The events which
preceded Mitchell's enhanced sentence are as follows.
One Fall evening, a group of young black men and boys, including
Mitchell, were gathered at an apartment complex in Kenosha, Wisconsin. 6'
Several members of the group were discussing a disturbing scene from the
motion picture Mississippi Burning, in which a white man beat a young
black boy who was praying.62 While still discussing the movie, approximately ten members of the group moved outside and Mitchell asked them:
"Do you all feel hyped up to move on some white people? '63 Shortly after
this comment, a fourteen year old white boy approached the location of the
group on the opposite side of the street. As the boy walked by, Mitchell
said to his companions, "[y]ou all want to fuck somebody up? There goes
a white boy, go get him." 64 Mitchell counted to three, pointed in the

57. Mitchell, 485 N.W. 2d at 810.
58. Id. at 808. See Lawrence, supra note 50; see also Michael S. Degan, "Adding the
FirstAmendment to the Fire": Cross Burning and Hate Crime Laws, 26 CREIGHTON L. REv.
1109 (1993).
59. Id. at 809 (citing to WIS. STAT. § 939.645(1)(b) (1989-90)). At the time of
Mitchell's trial, the Wisconsin penalty-enhancement statute provided:
(1) If a person does all of the following, the penalties for the underlying crime are
increased as provided in sub. (2): (a) Commits a crime under chs. 939 to 948. (b)
Intentionally selects the person against whom the crime under par. (a) is committed
or selects the property which is damaged or otherwise affected by the crime under
par. (a) because of the race, religion, color, sexual orientation, national origin or
ancestry of that person or the owner or occupant of that property ....
WIs. STAT. § 939.645(1)(b) (1989-90).
60. Id. at 808.
61. Id. at 809.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Mitchell, 485 N.W. 2d at 809.
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6
direction of the boy, and the angry group ran toward their victim. They
viciously attacked him, beating him severely to the point of unconsciousness
and then stealing his "British Knights" tennis shoes.' The attack caused
extensive injuries, inducing a four-day coma and possibly permanent brain
damage.67
Todd Mitchell was convicted in the Circuit Court of Kenosha County
for aggravated battery, a crime which carried a maximum sentence of two
years.68 However, because the jury found that Mitchell intentionally
selected his victim because of the boy's race, Wisconsin's penalty enhancement statute increased the potential maximum sentence for the offense to
seven years. 69 The circuit court then sentenced Mitchell to four year in
prison for the aggravated battery.7°
After unsuccessfully seeking post-conviction relief in the circuit court,
Mitchell appealed his conviction and sentence in the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals, challenging the constitutionality of the penalty enhancement
provision on First Amendment grounds.7" The court rejected this challenge, and affirmed the circuit court's judgment. 2
However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court sharply disagreed and reversed
the court of appeals. 3 In reaching this conclusion, the court strongly relied
on the Supreme Court's analysis of content-based regulations of speech
developed in R.A. V.v. City of St. Paul,74 holding that the government may
not regulate speech on the basis of hostility towards the idea expressed by
the speaker.7" From this the court concluded that the Wisconsin legislature
76
cannot criminalize bigoted thought with which it disagrees. Moreover,
the court held that the statute directly violated the First Amendment by

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 473 N.W.2d I (Wis. Ct. App. 1993). Mitchell also
challenged the statute on Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and vagueness grounds.
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that Mitchell waived his equal protection claim and
rejected his vagueness challenge outright. The Wisconsin Supreme Court declined to address
both claims, and because these issues were not developed in the court below, the Supreme
Court ruled that they plainly fell outside the question on which certiorari was granted.72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992)
75. State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 814 (Wis. 1992) (citing R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at
2546-48 (1992)).
76. Id. at 815.
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punishing what the legislature has deemed to be offensive thought, fully
rejecting the view of the state and the dissent that the statute punished only
the "conduct" of intentional selection of a victim and not the motive or
thought behind the selection." In addition, the court feared that since the
Wisconsin statute would result in the evidentiary use of protected speech it
would have a "chilling effect" on free speech, indirectly violating the First
Amendment.7" By sweeping protected activity within the reach of government regulation, the court reasoned that the statute is unconstitutionally
overbroad, in effect deterring citizens from exercising their protected
constitutional freedoms of speech and expression. 79 Finally, the court
distinguished anti-discrimination laws, which have long been held constitutional, as involving "objective acts of discrimination," rather than "subjective
mental processes. "8 Because the "selection" being punished under the hate
crime statute is not an act, but purely a mental process, the court reasoned
that the law created an "Orwellian" thought crime, obviously not punishable
under our system of government.8" Therefore, the court concluded that as
disgraceful and deplorable as this and other hate crimes are, the personal
prejudices of the attackers are protected by the First Amendment, and the
Wisconsin statute was struck down as unconstitutional.8 2 Soon thereafter
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review this decision.
A. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION

The Wisconsin Supreme Court was the first court to apply the rationale

of the 1992 United States Supreme Court case, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,3

to a hate crime penalty-enhancing statute.I Believing that the Wisconsin
court had misinterpreted this case, the Supreme Court presumed the need to
further define the prohibitions of the First Amendment and propose a clear
standard for reviewing content-based restrictions on free speech, as opposed
to punishment of criminal conduct resulting from hate speech. The Court
77. Id. at 811. In contrast, the dissenting justices opined that the statute punished only

the intentional lawless conduct, since the beliefs or expression of the defendant were relevant
only as they related to a crime. In this way, the dissent reasoned that the statute did not
punish the thought or expression of bigotry, only the conduct of acting upon these beliefs.
Id. at 818-20 (Abrahamson, J., Bablitch, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 815.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 816-17.
81. Id. at 817. See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949) (fictional work describing a society
in which the government could read and punish citizen's thoughts).
82. State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 817-18 (Wis. 1992).
83. 112 S.Ct. 2538 (1992).
84. See State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis. 1992).
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also recognized the importance of the question presented, and the existence
of a conflict of authority among state high courts on the constitutionality of
8
the
statutes similar to Wisconsin's penalty enhancement provision. " Thus,
86
Court.
Supreme
Wisconsin
the
reversed
and
certiorari
Court granted
The Court first addressed the argument that the statute punishes bigoted
thought by emphasizing that previous cases have rejected the "view that an
apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the
87
person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea."
Thus, the Court reasoned that physical assault is not expressive conduct
protected by the First Amendment.88 Further, the Court stated that
"[v]iolence or other types of potentially expressive activities that produce
special harms distinct from their communicative impact . . . are entitled to
no constitutional protection," and that "[t]he First Amendment does not
protect violence."89 Therefore, the bias-motivated criminal conduct is not
protected as free speech, and is subject to state penalties.
Nonetheless, the Court recognized that under the Wisconsin statute the
same criminal conduct could be more heavily punished if the victim was
90 The
selected because of his race than if no such motive was obtained.
statute enhanced the maximum penalty for conduct motivated by a
discriminatory point of view more severely than that same conduct being
engaged in for some other reason, or no reason at all. 9' The Court justified
this use of discriminatory motive by pointing out that traditionally
sentencing judges have considered a wide variety of factors in determining
92 After stating that
what sentence to impose upon a convicted defendant.
the defendant's motive for committing the offense is one important factor,
the Court also stressed the holdings in previous Supreme Court cases that
racial animus may be considered when relevant to the issues in the
proceeding. 93 Through these cases, the Court established that although a
defendant's abstract beliefs may not be taken into account by a sentencing
judge, relevant elements of racial hatred in the commission of an offense
85. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2198 (1993).
86. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2198.
87. Id. at 2199 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)).
88. Id.
89. Id. (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) and
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982)).
90. Id. at 2199.
91. Id.
92. Id. (citing to Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 818-20 (1991); United States v.
Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949)).
93. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2200 (citing Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992);
Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983)). See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
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may permissibly be considered. 94
In addition to this argument, the Court justified punishing discriminatory motive by paralleling the Wisconsin statute with federal and state
anti-discrimination laws, which have previously been upheld against
constitutional challenge.95 The Court used Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 196496 as an example of a statute which prohibits discrimination,
but which does not infringe upon First Amendment rights. 97 According to
the Court, Title VII is comparable to the Wisconsin statute in that both are
aimed at unprotected conduct rather than at expression, thus making both
laws permissible content-neutral regulations of conduct.9"
Moreover,
regardless of this analogy, the Court concluded that the state's desire to
redress special harms allegedly caused by hate crimes provided an adequate
explanation for the penalty enhancement provision, over and above mere
disagreement with the offenders' beliefs or biases. 99
Finally, the Court reasoned that the possible "chilling effect" on free
expression hypothesized by the Wisconsin Supreme Court was too
speculative, and therefore did not support an overbreadth claim.'0°
Furthermore, the Court opined that the First Amendment does not prohibit
the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime, or to
prove motive or intent.' ° Citing to several precedents, the Court reiterated that although such evidence is to be scrutinized with care, evidence of a
defendant's previous declarations or statements is commonly admissible in
criminal trials." 2 Thus, the Court held that Mitchell's First Amendment
rights were not violated by application of the penalty enhancement
provision, and the judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court was reversed.' °3

94. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2200.

95. Id. (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984); Hishon v.
King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976)).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (1988)
97. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2200 (1993) (citing to 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2 (1988) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discriminatory
employment practices)).
98. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2200-01.
99. Id. at 2201.
100. The Court found no merit in the Wisconsin Supreme Court's contention that
allowing the evidentiary use of speech may impermissibly chill free expression, causing
citizens to suppress any unpopular beliefs for fear of later consequences. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2201-02 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Street
v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631 (1947)).
103. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2202.
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B. ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court sought to find hate crime penalty enhancement
statutes constitutional, and devised an analysis to accomplish this goal. The
enthusiasm to reach this end resulted in a suspiciously brief opinion,
uncharacteristically sparse in First Amendment precedent. One of the most
notable omissions is the absence of any significant discussion concerning
°
a case not only addressing hate crime
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,'O
legislation, but also heavily relied on by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
Decided by the Supreme Court immediately prior to Mitchell, the R.A.V.
Court invalidated a Minnesota bias crime ordinance, and indicated a
strengthening of the traditional First Amendment ban on content-based
regulation. 0 5 In addition, the R.A.V. Court sharply reduced the already
narrow scope of the "fighting words" exception, stating that although this
category may sometimes be regulated, such expression is not invisible to the6
basis of content.'
Constitution, and may not be proscribed solely on the
Further, because the Minnesota ordinance created a separate crime for
conduct based on biased motivation, it punished conduct because of the
the Court held it to be facially
ideas the conduct expressed. Therefore,
07
Amendment.
First
the
under
invalid
Although R.A.V. discussed a bias crime ordinance that sought to
regulate fighting words, rather than a penalty enhancement statute for crimes
accompanied by a biased or prejudicial motivation, the underlying analysis
is similar. Following the Court's decision in R.A. V., which expanded the
ban on content-based regulation, legal theorists questioned whether any hate
crime legislation could withstand constitutional challenge. It seemed
especially unlikely that penalty enhancement statutes could be found valid,
since these statutes take behavior that is already punishable and increase the
punishment when the offender expresses bias. Therefore, like the St. Paul
ordinance, these statutes impermissibly punish expression based on its
content. 0 8 However, to avoid this conclusion, the Court contrived a new
104. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
105. The Minnesota ordinance made it a crime to display a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti, including but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika,
which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2540-41.
106. Id. at 2540. Even before this, courts were reluctant to uphold convictions under
the fighting words doctrine and the Supreme Court has never done so.
107. Id. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
108. Compare Shannon L. Taylor, The Debate Over Regulation of Racist Speech:
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 41 KAN. L. REV. 137, 142 (1993) with First Amendment -Bias-Motivated Crimes -- Court Strikes Down Hate Crimes Penalty Enhancer Statute, 106
HARV. L. REV. 957 (1993) (supporting the constitutional validity of hate crime statutes).
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analysis, contending that the reasoning in R.A. V. did not apply because that
ordinance was explicitly directed at speech, while the statute at issue in
Mitchell was aimed at conduct unprotected by the First Amendment. 1°9
In addition, the Court stated that conduct is not labeled "speech" whenever
the person intends thereby to express an idea, thus physical violence is
entitled to no constitutional protection."0
Although it is tempting to justify hate crime laws by separating speech
from conduct, it is impossible to maintain such a dichotomy. First, often the
two are intermingled with the conduct serving as the expression, such as in
the case of flag burning."' Second, when dealing with a penalty enhancement statute, if the two are separated it is clear that the conduct itself is
already punished by the criminal code, therefore, the enhanced sentence is
aimed directly at the racist expression. The government could not, of
course, constitutionally punish bigoted thoughts and expressions independently, and the power to punish the underlying action should not remove the
constitutional barrier to punishing the thought. However, through Mitchell,
the Court proposes that because these beliefs are held by one who committed a crime, the constitutional shield does not apply." 2
It may be argued that since hate crime statutes are directed at conduct
in addition to speech or thought, they could be upheld under the rule set
forth in United States v. O'Brien."3 Under O'Brien, the government may
further important interests through regulation which is directed at conduct,
but which incidentally infringes upon First Amendment interests, if the
governmental interest is "unrelated to the suppression" of beliefs or
expression." 4 However, as noted by the Supreme Court in the more
recent case of Texas v. Johnson,"' where the governmental interest is
related to the suppression of expression, O'Brien's "less stringent standard"
does not apply. Moreover, the O'Brien rule does not permit criminalization
of thought and expression, rather it permits regulation of conduct even
where that regulation affects First Amendment interests.' 6 In enacting
hate crime laws that enhance penalties for bigoted motivation, a state is not
109. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2196 (1993).
110. Id. at 2199 (citing to Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984)).
111. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
112. Of course, the First Amendment protection guaranteed the actor's thoughts does
not protect him or her from prosecution for the associated action. Neither, however, does
the state's power to punish the action remove the constitutional barrier to punishing the
thoughts. See Gellman, supra note 31, at 363.
113. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
114. Id. at 376-77.

115. 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989). See supra text accompanying note 18.
116. See Gellman, supra note 31, at 376.
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regulating conduct despite its expressive elements, but is actually penalizing
already proscribed conduct more severely because of its expressive elements.
This penalizing of expression is precisely what the First Amendment forbids.
In a related argument, the State of Wisconsin asserted that the statute
did not punish bigoted thought, but rather punished the "conduct" of
intentional selection of a victim." 7 However, this argument merely
characterizes the defendant's thoughts as conduct, it does not make
regulation of these thoughts permissible. In any assault there is selection of
a victim, whether it is because the person is black, female or simply because
the person looks rich. The choosing of a victim "because of' a certain
factor is the motive behind the selection, and punishment of this mental
process directly implicates and encroaches upon the First Amendment."8
This view was supported in Ohio v. Wyant,' where the Ohio Supreme
Court invalidated a penalty enhancement law following similar logic. In
Wyant, the defendant was convicted of aggravated menacing after threatening a black couple, and sentenced under Ohio's penalty enhancement
provision." Citing R.A. V., the court reversed the conviction and held that
the statute unconstitutionally infringed on the viewpoint of the assailant by
punishing motive.'
The court reasoned that the effect of punishing
motive is to create a "thought crime," which is in violation of the Constitution." It concluded that the government is not free to punish an idea, it
may only punish acts motivated by the idea.'23 Therefore, since the
criminal code already accomplishes punishment of the act, enhancement of
the penalty through a hate crime law unconstitutionally encroaches on First
Amendment freedoms.124
Criminal law is not concerned with a person's motives for committing
crimes per se, but rather with -an actor's intent or purpose in doing so.
"Motive," "intent" and "purpose" are all related concepts in that they refer
to thought processes. However, they are legally distinct in crucial respects.
"Unlike purpose or intent, motive cannot be a criminal offense or an element
of an offense."'" A statute designed to punish the subjective motivation
117. State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 812 (Wis. 1992).
118. Id. at 812.
119. 597 N.E.2d 450 (Ohio 1992).
120. Id. at 450-51.
121. Id. at 453-56.
122. Id. at 459.
123. Id. at 458.
124. Id. at 459.
125. Gellman, supra note 31, at 364 stating:
[U]nlike intent, 'motive is not relevant on the substantive side of the criminal law
....When A murders B in order to obtain B's money, A's intent was to kill and
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or personal prejudices of the actor, impermissibly infringes on First Amendment rights. "Punishment of one's thoughts, however repugnant, is
unconstitutional."12 "The ideological content of the thought targeted by
the [Wisconsin] hate crime statute is identical to that targeted by the St. Paul
ordinance in R.A.V.--racial or other discriminatory animus."' 27 In R.A.V.,
the Supreme Court concluded that the "legislature may not single out and
punish that ideological content."'' 28
Nonetheless, the Mitchell Court
ignored this parallel, and upheld the Wisconsin law as valid.
Not only did the Court ignore R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the only prior
Supreme Court case to address modem hate crime legislation, it also
disregarded the majority of First Amendment precedents, which have
overwhelmingly invalidated governmental restrictions on speech and
expression.129 Rather, the Court turned to principles of criminal law and
federal civil rights law. Reasoning that motive is a constitutional factor
traditionally considered in sentencing and anti-discrimination cases, the
Court concluded that it is therefore also a valid consideration in hate crime

Id.

his motive was to get money.' This is true even with respect to specific intent
crimes, for which it is necessary to determine the purpose for which the defendant
acted. For example, if A breaks into B's house, the act is burglary only if A did
so for the purpose of committing a crime... . 'When A breaks into B's house
in order to get money to pay his debts, it is appropriate to characterize the purpose
of taking money as the intent and the desire to pay his debts as the motive.'
"Intent" thus refers to the actor's mental state as it determines culpability based on
volition, "purpose" connotes what the actor plans as a result of the conduct.., and
"motive" is the term for the actor's underlying, propelling reasons for acting, which
may have no direct relationship to the type of conduct chosen.

126. Id. at 364 (footnote omitted) (quoting W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW
§ 3.6 at 227 (2d ed. 1986). State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 814 (Wis. 1992). The Court
added that freedom of speech is, of course, not absolute. "For example, the government may
regulate or punish 'fighting words' that are likely to provoke the average person to
retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace." However, the bigoted thought which
is punished by this statute does not fit this category. Further, while a person's bigoted
speech may provoke retaliation, the "fighting words" doctrine is extremely narrow and has
never been used to uphold a speech limiting statute since its inception in 1942.
127. Id. at 815.
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992); Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397 (1989); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); City Council
of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984); Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50
(1976); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
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legislation.'" However, this analogy is inaccurate and incorrect. First,
although "it is permissible to consider evil motive or moral turpitude when
sentencing for a particular crime ...it is quite a different matter to sentence
for the underlying crime and then to add to that criminal sentence a separate
' 31
enhancer that is directed solely to punish the evil motive for the crime."'
The Supreme Court relied on the holding in Barclay v. Florida,132 which
allowed a sentencing judge to take into account the defendant's racial
animus towards his victim. Because "the elements of racial hatred in [the]
murder" were relevant to several aggravating factors, the Court held that the
trial judge permissibly took this evidence into account in sentencing the
defendant to death. 33 Although the Court concedes that Barclay did not
involve application of a penalty enhancement statute, it nevertheless
rationalized that considering racial animus to determine whether the
defendant should be sentenced to death is "surely the most severe 'enhancement' of all."" The key distinction the Court fails to recognize is that
the defendant in Barclay could have been sentenced to death anyway, as this
was the maximum sentence for his crime. In fact, looking further into the
case, not only did Barclay have an extensive criminal record, there were also
many other statutory aggravating circumstances that allowed for imposition
of the death penalty. Therefore, the maximum allowable sentence was not
being exceeded through consideration of a racist motive or any other
evidence. In contrast, under penalty enhancement laws bias motivation is
not merely one of the factors considered when determining whether the
defendant should receive the maximum penalty for the underlying crime.
Rather, a defendant may receive the maximum penalty for the criminal
offense and then receive an additional penalty for his or her motivation.
This is not the same as permitting a sentencing judge to consider a wide
variety of factors in determining what sentence to impose. The Court states
that "[m]otives are most relevant when the trial judge sets the defendant's
sentence, and it is not uncommon for a defendant to receive a minimum
sentence because he was acting with good motives, or a rather high sentence
because of his bad motives."' 35 By attempting to illustrate the concept of
good or bad motives as acceptable considerations, the Court inadvertently
points out the error in its argument. These factors are actually considered
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2199-200 (1993).
State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W. 2d 807, 815 n.17 (Wis. 1992).
463 U.S. 939 (1983).
Id. at 949.
Mitchell, 113 S.Ct. at 2200.
Id. at 2199 (quoting W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW

3.6(b), 324 (1986)).

§
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within the framework of a minimum and maximum penalty for the crime,
and used to determine the most accurate punishment within this spectrum.
Thus, racial animus may be an aggravating factor, but as discussed earlier
it cannot be a crime in and of itself. Moreover, "[c]onduct motivated by
bigotry can be constitutionally [and adequately] punished under the criminal
code without resort[ing] to constructing a thought crime." 6 As observed
by Justice Scalia in his R.A.V. opinion, the government "has sufficient
means at its disposal to prevent such behavior without adding the First
Amendment to the fire."'' 3' Because penalty enhancement statutes have
the effect of penalizing bias motive as a separate crime, they should be
unconstitutional.
Similarly, federal and state civil rights and anti-discrimination laws do
not provide a precedent or justification for criminally penalizing motive. In
Mitchell, the Court asserted that "motive played the same role under the
Wisconsin statute as under federal and state anti-discrimination laws, which
have [been] previously upheld against constitutional challenge.' 38 It
concluded that a defendant's discriminatory motive, or reason, for acting
could be punished. The Court offered the example of "Title VII... [which]
makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee
'because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin,"'
stressing that this statute was found not to infringe on employers' First
Amendment rights in Hishon v. King & Spalding.139 The flaw in the
Court's reasoning, however, is that "[d]iscrimination and bigotry are not the
same thing: the former is an illegal act, and the latter is a constitutionally
protected attitude."' 4 "Under anti-discrimination statutes, it is the discriminatory act which is prohibited, [but] under the hate crime statute, [it is] the
'selection' which is [being] punished. 14 ' This is not an act, it is
a
subjective mental process, and as such not punishable under the First
Amendment, It is the discriminatory act and not the racial or bias motive
that Congress intended to prohibit through anti-discrimination statutes. 1 42
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

See Ohio v. Wyant, 597 N.E. 2d 450, 459 (Ohio 1992).
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2550 (1992).
Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2200.
Id. (citing to Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984)).
Gellman, supra note 30, at 367-68.
State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W. 2d 807, 816-17 (Wis. 1992); see also State v. Wyant,

597 N.E.2d 450, 456 (Ohio 1992).
142. See Gellman, supra note 31, at 367-68 n.161.

Several of the Federal antidiscrimination statutes were enacted specifically to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, which
addresses the deprivation of rights by the government. "For example, 18 U.S.C. § 242
(1988) imposes penalties for deprivation of another's civil rights 'by reason of his color, or
race,' but this applies only to action taken under color of state law. State action is a central
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In fact, racial or other animus is not even necessary for liability under the
statutes. "A prima facie case for discrimination can be made out under Title
VII by showing that a specific employment practice has caused a disparate
43 A showing of discriminatory intent is
impact upon different groups.'
not required. As pointed out in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,'" Congress
created the Act to address "the consequences of employment practices, not
145
This analysis does not look to the
the [underlying] . .. motivation."'
employer's motivation, it demonstrates that discrimination is equally
possible without any bias-related or discriminatory motive. Also, the statute
does not punish motive, as the hate crime statute does, it punishes objective
146
Furtheracts of discrimination such as refusal to hire or termination.
more, without these statutes it would be impossible to combat such acts of
discrimination. In contrast, the acts subject to penalty enhancement under
the hate crime statute are already redressed by the criminal code, precluding
the need for any additional means of punishment.
Finally, although hate crime laws target illegal conduct as well as
offensive expression or bigoted motivation, they effectively sweep within
their reach constitutionally protected speech, association and thought. This
overbreadth leads to a chilling effect, deterring citizens from exercising their
protected constitutional freedoms. The statutes must rely upon a defendant's
speech and associations for evidence of a punishable bigoted motive, thereby
threatening to directly penalize the speech and association. This necessity
to use speech to prove a defendant's intentional selection of a victim can
chill free speech. The Supreme Court dismissed this hypothesis as too
speculative to support an overbreadth claim, adding that evidence of a
defendant's previous declarations or statements is commonly admitted in

requirement to sections 242 and 243, and therefore these statutes are irrelevant to the analysis
of the constitutionality of hate crime laws." United States v. Stokes, 506 F.2d 771 (5th Cir.
1975); United States v. Cooney, 217 F. Supp. 417 (D.Colo. 1963). "Moreover, the Supreme
Court has specified that the 'by reason of' language in section 242 does not relate to the
offender's motive." United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) (construing former
18 U.S.C. § 52). "Also, other sections, such as 241, do not require state action, but they do
not include any 'by reason of motive element, and refer to specific purposes and effects.
18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 244, 247 (1988). Section 245 prohibits specifically enumerated acts of
discrimination, so under this section, as in the civil anti-discrimination laws, the conduct
involved is not prohibited without the discriminatory motive." Id. at n.161.
143. Id. at 368. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988); see also
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989) (upholding the disparate
impact test for Title VII employment discrimination claims).
144. 401 U.S. 424 (1971)

145. Id. at 432.
146. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 817.

1994:861]

WISCONSIN V. MITCHELL

criminal trials to establish the elements of a crime or to prove intent. 47

Although the First Amendment is not a per se barrier to the use of a
defendant's words as evidence of other elements of a criminal offense, such

a practice creates the risk that a defendant will in fact be punished for his
or her words rather than the resulting conduct. The Court erred in failing
to recognize the distinction between the use of an actor's words as the sole
evidence of an element of an offense, and their use as an actual element of
the offense. When speech is used as evidence of an element of an offense,
there is no likelihood of confusing the speech itself with the elements of the
offenses evidenced thereby. For instance, presenting evidence that a
defendant used a note in a bank robbery or divulged information in an
antitrust violation would not infringe on First Amendment rights.'" The
illegal conduct consists of a verbal act, but the actor's beliefs, opinions and
ideas are not at issue. A penalty enhancement statute is aimed directly at
a defendant's bigoted beliefs, for without them there is no violation of the
statute.
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has consistently resolved the
"evidence as element" problem in favor of protecting First
Amendment
rights, in Mitchell, the Court disregarded this precedent. In prior cases, the
Court has held that it could not "sustain a conviction that may have rested
on a form of expression, however distasteful, which the Constitution
tolerates and protects."' 49 In Street v. New York, ' the defendant was
charged under a statute that criminalized public mutilation of a flag and
"publicly ... defy[ing] ... or cast[ing] contempt upon [an American
flag]
by words." The Court refused to uphold a conviction under the statute
because it found it impossible to say that "words were not an independent
cause of the conviction. ' "'5
This precedent seems to lend support to
invalidation of hate crime statutes, since the statute at issue had the effect
of punishing words or even thoughts through a longer sentence. However,
the Mitchell Court chose not to address this precedent, and instead cited to
Haupt v. United States 52 to support the contention that the First Amendment does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech. In Haupt, the
defendant was tried for the offense of treason. 53 To prove that the acts

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2201-02 (1993).
See Gellman, supra note 31, at 359-60.
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 594 (1969).
394 U.S. 576 (1969).
Id. at 589.
330 U.S. 631 (1947).
Id.
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in question were committed out of "adherence to the enemy," the government introduced evidence of conversations that had taken place long prior
to the indictment, some of which consisted of statements showing Haupt's
sympathy with Germany and Hitler, as well as hostility towards the United
States. 4 The Court held that while "such testimony is to be scrutinized
with care to be certain the statements are not expressions of mere lawful and
permissible difference of opinion with our own government or quite proper
were admissible on
appreciation of the land of birth .... these statements
155
enemy.''
the
to
adherence
and
the question of intent
Although the Court used this case for support, it is not actually
analogous to Mitchell. There are some important differences the Court
overlooked. First, the statements were being used as evidence of elements
of the offense, not as actual elements of the offense itself. In fact, the
Court pointed out in the holding, that the declarations were to be used only
as evidence of intent and adherence to the enemy; two elements of
treason. 5 6 Further, the statements would not have been admissible if they
Under a hate crime statute, the speech is not
merely reflected opinion.'
used as evidence to establish the manifested criminal act, it is punished as
an element of the offense. It is also an opinion of the defendant, and as
such not admissible or punishable. Second, treason is a unique crime, in
that under the Constitution it may depend very much on proof of motive,
5
Finally, with
especially to prove the acts in question were criminal.
to a discrimisimilar
crime,
the
of
evidence
treason speech may be the sole
act that was
the
be
natory action of an employer, however it would still
being punished rather than just the speech or beliefs. This is not true of any
of the crimes applicable under the hate crime statutes. Primarily, proof of
motive is not necessary to show the criminality of the act. For instance,
when a defendant commits a battery, it is clear that there was a criminal act
committed despite the reason for choosing the victim. It is punishable as a
crime, without the assistance of prior declarations or proof of motive, a
feature not present with the crime of treason. Also, as discussed previously,
hate crime penalty enhancement statutes punish the defendant's subjective
beliefs, not an objective act such as discrimination or treason, which often
59
For these
involve speech or even thought as part of the offense.'
a hate
under
reasons, treason is obviously not analogous to penalization
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 642.
Id.
Id.

Id.
158. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2201-02 (1993).
159. See supra text accompanying note 139.
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crime statute, and the Court erred in using this example as its sole support
to uphold the penalty enhancement statute in this evidentiary respect.
In concluding that penalty enhancement statutes are constitutional, the
Court abandoned the consistency of stare decisis to formulate an analysis
convenient to meet the desired end. Despite the legitimacy of the end,
however, the means employed are not permissible. Although bigotry is
offensive, disgraceful and anti-social, such personal prejudices are protected
by the First Amendment. The Constitution may not embrace or encourage
bigoted hateful thoughts, but it surely protects them1 6° There is no
authority declaring such thoughts or speech as being in an unprotected class,
and as the Supreme Court has previously stated, "[w]e must not confuse
what is 'good,' 'desirable,' or 'expedient' with what is constitutionally
commanded by the First Amendment."'16' Therefore, although the motivation of hate crime legislation may be admirable, the Court erred in
upholding such statutes as constitutional.
III. PRACTICAL IMPACT

The danger in solving a social problem with a limitation on expression
is that each limitation, no matter how seemingly small, represents a sacrifice
of liberty. When the speech being proscribed is deemed offensive and
undesirable by most people, as is the case with hate crime laws, the sacrifice
may seem insignificant. However, this restriction invites further incursions,
which may not be as insignificant to as many people. Thus, a "slippery
slope" effect is created, and society must "beware that first false step."1 62
There is a cost to society as a whole whenever some expression is labeled
as intolerable. Tolerance of all kinds of ideas, including those that are
harmful or offensive, is an important value of American society and a
hallmark of our legal system.163 Even if threatening ideas are assumed to
be false, there is value to the search for truth in tolerating their expression.' 6 Recognizing that there is another, perhaps "wrong way" to look'

160. State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W. 2d 807, 817 (Wis. 1992).
161. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 13 (1978).
162. EUGENE EHRLICH, NIL DESPERANDUM 107 (Guild Publishing 1987) (quoting the
Latin poet Virgil in the Aeneid).
163. See L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 9 (1986).
1 164. As support for the argument that protection of speech, although assumed false, is
needed as a stimulus to examination and deeper understanding of truth, Bollinger quoted John
Stuart Mill:
Through confrontation with falsehood, people retain a "livelier" sense of the truths
they themselves already hold but which may have become stagnant: Through
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at something, forces us to think about the way we look at it, and perhaps
reinforces our values as we defend why they are "right." It also insures the
availability of the broadest possible range of ideas and expression, allowing
in the
society to choose the best ideas, rather than placing the government
65
ideas.
of
acceptability
or
worthiness
of
arbiter
position of
Another negative consequence of proscribing speech and expression is
a chilling effect upon free speech. Although the Supreme Court in Mitchell
rejected this argument as too speculative, the reasoning used to reach this
6 The chilling effect
conclusion was fatally flawed in its narrowness."
goes further than merely deterring an individual from uttering a racial
epithet during a battery. 67 Hate crime statutes threaten to chill every kind
of speech. In addition to any words that a person may speak during, just
prior to or in association with the commission of one of the underlying
offenses, all of his or her remarks upon earlier occasions, any books ever
read, speakers ever listened to or associations ever held could be introduced
as evidence that he or she held racist views and was acting upon them at the
time of the offense.'" Thus, anyone charged with an underlying offense
could possibly be charged with intentional selection of a victim, after
extensive public scrutiny.' 69 This could lead to habitual self-censorship
of expression of one's ideas, and reluctance to read or listen publicly to the
ideas of others, whenever one fears that those ideas might run contrary to
7 ° It is no answer, as
popular sentiment on the subject of ethnic relations.
the Supreme Court proposed, that one need only refrain from committing
censorship, we "lose what is almost as great a benefit [as truth], the clearer
perception and livelier impression of truth produced by its collision with error."
Truth requires regular exercise, as it were, and without it atrophies into dogma.
Id. at 54-55 (quoting J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (C. Shield ed. 1956)).
165. See Gellman, supra note 31, at 381-84; see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977) ("[Alt the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an
individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs should
be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the state").
166. 'See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2201 (1993).
167. See State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 816 (Wis. 1992).
168. Id. (quoting Gellman, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REV. at 360-61).

169. Id.

170. Id.; See Gellman, supra note 31, at 360 n.131 (stating that "[t]he possibility of
self-censorship is only as great as the public awareness of the statute, of course. But this is
equally true of the deterrent effect of the statute with respect to the constitutionally restrictable conduct. If the statute is so universally unknown that there could be no possibility of
self-censorship of protected thought and speech whatever, then the statute would also be
useless in deterring anything else. It seems likely, however, that public awareness of the
existence of this type of statute (if not.its details) would be relatively high, as prosecutions
under ethnic intimidation statutes tend to draw media attention").
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one of the underlying offenses to avoid the punishment. Chill of expression
and inquiry by definition occurs before any offense is committed, and even
if no offense is committed.' 7'
Moreover, epithets and slurs are not the
only speech chilled by hate crime statutes.172 A person genuinely wondering about ethnic differences or subjects sqch as intermarriage, genetic
differences, affirmative action or integration might think twice about airing
his or her thoughts, knowing that they could be used later as damning
evidence. 173 Such suppression of speech serves only to perpetuate
ignorance and to limit the information available for society to make an
intelligent choice. The chilling effect thus extends to the entire populace,
74
not just those who will eventually commit one of the underlying crimes.
In addition to the costs imposed upon society in general, hate crime
laws create the risk that burdens will be imposed upon the very groups they
seek to protect. Ultimately the benefits of the legislation may outweigh the
burdens, but this is not always the case, so careful consideration of the costs
is vital. Although hate crime laws are drafted so as to protect all people,
minorities are more typically the victims of hate crimes, therefore as applied
and probably as state legislatures expected, the laws protect these groups
most often. Any legislation designed to protect certain groups from other
people's prejudice carries an implicit patronizing and paternalistic message.
Although the state's desire is to recognize that a certain group may have a
particular vulnerability to some expression, at the same time it is imposing
a stigma. Through statutes aiming to prohibit certain expressions or speech
which may be particularly offensive to a certain group, the legislature
presents the picture that these groups can be hurt more easily by others and
that they are dependent upon the state to protect them. The intent and effect
are similar to those of laws imposing higher penalties for crimes committed
against children and the elderly. Society wishes to protect them because
they are more helpless than others; the protection is beneficial, but it
reinforces the belief of weakness. 75 It suggests that members of the
protected group are weaker than everyone else, and that they cannot gain
acceptance by themselves. Further, the stigma operates both upon the
171. State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W. 2d 807, 816 (Wis. 1992). See e.g., Grimm v.'
Churchill, 932 F. 2d 674, 675-76 (7th Cir. 1991) (fact that arresting officer in ethnic
intimidation case "had heard through his brother-in-law that Grimm had a history of making
racial insults and engaging in racial confrontations" supported conclusion that officer had
probable cause to arrest); see also People v. Lamkin, 457 N.E. 2d 50 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
172. See Gellman, supra note 31, at 361.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See Gellman, supra note 31, at 385; see also, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.0836
(West Supp. 1991).
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disempowered group itself and upon society generally in its view of that
group. 7 6 Members of the disempowered group may lose respect for their
group or themselves in response to the state's paternalistic treatment, while
the extra government protection may cause the majority to resent and
disrespect the protected group. An example of these consequences can be
seen in affirmative action programs. White males, the majority, often
complain about reverse discrimination and exhibit strong ambivalence
toward minority groups. Women and minority men fear that they are
male
perceived as unqualified tokens, less competent than their white
77 Almerits.
their
on
only
succeeding
as
co-workers who are viewed
though one may accept these effects as necessary evils, it must be recognized that such benevolent legislation has drawbacks and may even
aggravate ethnic tension rather than eliminate it. Although hate crime laws
are intended as tools to combat bigotry, they may in reality create increased
resentment toward disempowered groups and thus be self-defeating.
A further negative consequence of the enactment of hate crime
legislation is the inevitable slowing of alternative solutions for bigotry.
Non-criminal approaches to eliminating prejudice, such as education or
positive incentives for non-bigoted behavior, which may in the long run be
more effective, can be forgotten if there is already an apparent answer.
Social pressure can be a strong and effective tool for combating social
problems, and reinforcing certain behaviors. On the other hand, imposition
of criminal penalties does not necessarily result in the adoption of the
find ways
underlying policies. Instead, people who disagree with the policydetector.
178
radar
a
or
to get around the law, such as using a tax-loophole
Criminalization is a state's last and strongest effort to influence behavior,
but not always the most effective. The government cannot force a person
to hold certain beliefs, it can at best prohibit certain behaviors. However,
in the case of hate crime laws, this merely cures a symptom of the disease
while unfortunately dissuading the search for a real solution.

176. See Gellman, supra note 31, at 386.
177. See Wilkerson, Remedy for Racism of Past Has New Kind of Shackles: Affirmative
Action Can't Guarantee Acceptance, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1991 at 1, col. 1; see also
1991
Marriot, Unresolved: Role of Race in Law Class Admissions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28,
to
(letter
E16
at
1991
28,
Apr.
TIMES,
N.Y.
Blacks,
on
Assault
An
at E5, col. 4; Coleman,
the editor reading, "Character and ability mean nothing when powerful symbols are used.
. to implant the notion that African-Americans generally owe whatever accomplishments
at a
they have achieved to quotas or unfair competition in which whites have been placed
to
evidence
inferior;
as
us
brands
race
our
campaign,
a
such
of
face
the
In
disadvantage.
the contrary is irrelevant or not even acknowledged").
178. See Gellman, supra note 31, at 389-90.
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CONCLUSION

In Wisconsin v. Mitchell, the Supreme Court contrived an analysis
to meet the desired end of finding hate crime laws constitutional. However,
the problem with allowing legislation that penalizes and prohibits hate
speech is not in the legitimacy of the end, but in the means employed to
reach it. Although the elimination of bigotry and hate-motivated violence
are noble aspirations, the government cannot accomplish these goals by
ignoring the First Amendment.
Hate crime statutes directly implicate and encroach upon the First
Amendment by punishing motive, thought and speech. Even though bigotry
and racism are deplorable to most people, it is a strongly ingrained principle
that the government may not regulate expression because of its message,
ideas, subject matter or content. If there is a bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive
or disagreeable.18 In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,' the only other case
involving a modem hate crime law, the Supreme Court correctly adhered to
this principle and struck down the ordinance. 82 But in Mitchell, the Court
ignored this precedent and uncharacteristically disregarded the First
Amendment. In its haste to combat an obvious social problem, the Court
overlooked the flaws in its reasoning, inevitably creating more problems
than solutions. Freedom of speech is a deeply rooted tradition, which
should not be so casually traded for promises of a quick fix to a current
problem. Few people would disagree that suppression of hate crimes is an
admirable, if not required, goal of the government. However, when this
goal is reached through restrictions on expression, the greater evil becomes
the suppression of free speech for all society. As observed by Justice Scalia
in R.A. V., hate crimes are reprehensible, but the government "has sufficient
means at its disposal to prevent such behavior without adding the First
83
Amendment to the fire.'1
79
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